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Abstract—Security and privacy in Direct Load Control (DLC)
is a fundamental challenge in smart grids. In this paper, we pro-
pose a blockchain-based framework to increase security and pri-
vacy of DLC. We propose a method whereby participating nodes
share their data with the distribution company in an anonymous
and secure manner. To reduce the associated overhead for data
dissemination, we propose a hash-based transaction generation
method. We also outline the DLC process for managing the load
in consumer site. Qualitative analysis demonstrates the security
and privacy of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power systems are one of the fundamental infrastructures
of human societies. The proposal of “smart grid” in the early
21st century [1] has brought about profound transformations
to the operation of modern power systems. Development of
smart grid has been recognized as a way to relieve the grand
challenges of energy shortage and climate change.
A key enabler of smart grid technology is the deployment of
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [2]. A smart meter,
which is essentially an electronic device with communication
and computing functions, is a central component of AMI and
facilitates two way communication between customers and
the power utility company. In traditional power systems, the
information flow is one-way, which means the utility company
collects power demand (known as load) information from the
customer side, and schedules power generation to serve the
load. The growth in the smart grid technology enables two-way
communications where the customer can not only send load
data to the utility, but also receive control, electricity tariff,
and incentive signals from the utility. Based on the signals, the
customer’s load profile can be re-shaped to balance load and
demand in the grid. This is referred as the “demand response”
or “Demand Side Management (DSM)” [3] in the literature.
The two-way communication introduces new security and
privacy concerns for the consumers. The attackers may gain
access to the devices in the consumer site by compromising
the communications. The load data generated by the consumer
can be tracked by malicious nodes which in turn compromises
the user privacy. Thus, ensuring communication security and
privacy is one of the primary considerations in DSM.
Direct Load Control (DLC) is one of the fundamental
DSM methods [4]. In DLC, DIStribution COmpany (DISCO)
centrally collects load and demand requests and decides on re-
shaping energy consumption patterns for customers. However,
customers cannot verify the action of the energy utility, which
for example could include reducing the energy consumption
of the consumer. This is critical as DISCO may maliciously
decide on particular actions to increase its profit. DISCO can
access and control the devices installed in the user site based
on an initially signed contract. However, the user must be
able to monitor and check DISCO access to the devices and
the exchanged data.
Blockchain, a distributed, immutable, secure, and anony-
mous ledger of blocks, provides a possible solution to ad-
dress the outlined challenge. The participating nodes in
the blockchain communicate through transactions, which are
broadcast and verified by all participating nodes, thus achiev-
ing distributed management of blockchain. Each block main-
tains the hash of the previous block which ensures immutabil-
ity as modification of a block changes the block hash in the
consequent block. Participating nodes use changeable Public
Keys (PKs) as their identity which introduces a level of
anonymity.
The main contribution of this paper is to apply blockchain to
DLC to protect user privacy and security of communications.
Given that all participating nodes must be known to the
DISCO, we employ a permissioned blockchain. Thus, only
authorized nodes by DISCO can join the blockchain. The
participating nodes periodically send their load/demand data
to the DISCO, which in turn increases processing overhead in
the participants for generating and signing transactions with
asymmetric encryption. To address this challenge, we propose
a hash-based demand/load transaction, where the transaction
generator is no longer required to sign the transaction. The
authentication of the transaction generator and integrity of the
data are achieved using a secret hash value which is only
known by the transaction generator and DISCO.
Once DISCO collects the load/demand data, it adjusts the
energy consumption of participating nodes based on DLC.
Initially, DISCO and the user that wish to participate in DLC
sign a contract that contains details of DLC, e.g., the type of
sensors that can be installed. Then, DISCO installs sensors
in the consumer site to monitor a particular aspect of the
site to prevent inconvenience service, e.g., turning off the
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cooling system during hot weather. As outlined earlier in this
section, the consumer must monitor the access of DISCO to his
devices and the exchanged data by sensors. In our framework,
all communications between participants are stored in the
blockchain in the form of transactions. Thus, the consumer can
monitor the transactions generated by his devices for access
control. In summary the key contributions of this paper are as
follow:
• We propose a blockchain-based solution to DLC that
ensures user anonymity and security of communications.
• Our method reduces the processing overhead for sending
demand/load data while ensuring user anonymity and data
integrity.
• We introduce an access control mechanism which allows
users to monitor devices and sensors installed by DISCO.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section II
introduces the fundamental concepts of DSM. The proposed
blockchain-based DLC is presented in III. Section IV provides
a qualitative analyses on security and privacy of the proposed
framework. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and out-
lines future work.
II. INTRODUCTION OF DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT
This section presents an introductory discussion of DSM.
The goal of DSM is to action certain control decisions such
as offering incentives to re-shape load profile of the customers
to match the cumulative generation profile. The DSM actions
can be broadly categorized as indirect load control and direct
load control and are discussed below.
A. Indirect Load Control (ILC)
In ILC, also known as pricing-based DSM, DISCO utilizes
time-varying electricity pricing signals to stimulate customers
to shift their power consumption from peak hours to off-peak
hours, which eventually reduces the peak load of the grid. By
setting high electricity prices in peak-demand hours and low
prices in off-peak-demand hours, the user is encouraged to
shift the use of some appliances such as washing machines to
low price hours, to save the household’s electricity cost.
The most widely adopted time-varying electricity tariff
is Time-of-Use (TOU) which is widely employed in many
countries [5]. In TOU, one day is divided into multiple periods
and different electricity prices are applied in each period.
B. Direct Load Control (DLC)
In DLC, also known as incentive-based DSM, DISCO
directly asserts control of some customer-side appliances in
particular hours, e.g., noon time on some hot summer days
[4]. A contract is signed between the customer and DISCO
to agree on the specific hours during which DLC is enforced
and the appliances which will be controlled and the actions.
Then in the agreed hours, DISCO can control the ON/OFF
status or adjust power consumption of the appliances. As a
reward, DISCO often provides an economic subsidy to the
customer, such as cash reward or electricity price discount.
A representative industrial example of DLC is the SmartAC
program of Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) [8], in which the
air conditioners of a group of volunteering residential users
are controlled by the utility for load management.
In summary, although ILC is unintrusive to the user, it is
less reliable for DISCO for performing expected load shifting
as there is no guarantee that the customers shift their energy
usage pattern to respond to the time-varying electricity price.
In DLC, however, DISCO can directly control the appliances
and thus has the ability to enforce changes. However, security
and privacy concerns remain major challenges in applying
DLC as outlined in Section I. In this paper, we propose the
use of blockchain to address these challenges.
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DIRECT LOAD CONTROL
In this section, we discuss the details of the proposed
blockchain-based DLC framework. The participating nodes
in the system which include energy producers, consumers,
battery energy storage systems, and DISCO jointly form a
distributed network as shown in Figure 1. The identity of the
participating nodes is known to the DISCO. Thus, we use
a permissioned blockchain where participating nodes must be
authorized by DISCO to join the blockchain. DISCO generates
a genesis transaction, i.e., the first transaction in each ledger,
for each participant which enables them to generate and store
transactions in the blockchain.
The proposed framework consists of two fundamental steps:
1) Data dissemination where the participating nodes share their
data with DISCO, and 2) DLC where the DISCO controls the
load in the consumer site by adjusting energy consumption of
particular devices. The DISCO first has to collect load/demand
data from the participants in step 1. Accordingly, DISCO
decides on proper load adjusting actions for step 2. To reduce
the associated processing overhead on the participants, the
structure of the transactions is different in each step. In the first
step, where the participants frequently generate transactions,
we propose a hash-based transaction generation method that
does not require asymmetric encryption. The second step uses
PK and signatures for transaction generation as conventional
blockchains. Next, we outline the specific details of these
steps.
A. Data Dissemination
Initially, DISCO authorizes the nodes to join the permis-
sioned blockchain. DISCO needs to know the demand and
load of each participating node to balance the cumulative load
with the response and purchase or sell energy if required. The
participating nodes periodically report their load or demand
to the DISCO by generating and signing transactions using
asymmetric encryption. This incurs significant overhead on
participating nodes particularly given that most of participating
nodes have limited computation resources, e.g., smart meters.
To reduce the associated overheads, our method proposes a
hash-based verification mechanism as outlined below.
To share data, each node generates a Demand Load (DL)
transaction. The structure of the DL is as below:
ID||Data||DLFlag||Secret
Fig. 1. An overview of the proposed architecture.
Where ID is the unique identifier of the transaction
generator. During the bootstrapping, each node generates an
ID, a pattern, and a secret value and shares with DISCO.
To protect anonymity, the node changes the ID for each
transaction using a pattern, e.g., adding previous ID with a
constant value. Conceptually, this is similar to changing PK in
conventional blockchains. To verify the transactions, DISCO
stores all these fields and update them accordingly once it
receives transactions (outlined in detail in the rest of this
section). Data is the amount of demand or load for the user.
DLFlag identifies whether the value in Data field is demand
(DLFlag=0) or load (DLFlag=1). To reduce the overheads on
nodes for generating DL translations, a Secret is stored in the
last field which is the hash of three parameters which are:
H(secret value||nonce||Data)
Where H(x) is hash of x. The secret value is generated by
the node during bootstrapping. Nonce is a one-time value used
to prevent replay attack which conceptually is similar to the
nonce employed in Ethereum transactions [9]. The Data value
is included to prevent any node from changing the Data.
Each node generates and broadcasts the DL transactions in
pre-defined time intervals. Once received, the DISCO extracts
the ID of the transaction generator and locates the stored
details (that are secret value, nonce, and pattern) for that ID.
Then, the DISCO generates Secret, as outlined above, with
received Data and the corresponding nonce and secret value
in its own record. If the resulting hash matches with the Secret,
the transaction is verified. The DISCO then updates nonce and
ID for the node for future transactions. If the hash does not
match with the Secret, the transaction is dropped.
DISCO creates a Merkle tree of all received DL transactions
in a period. Next, it stores the signed root hash of the Merkle
tree in the blockchain. Storing only the root hash of the
Merkle tree in place of all received DL transactions reduces the
processing overhead and memory requirement for managing
the blockchain and thus increases its scalability. Note that the
demand/load data are only critical for the DISCO and other
participants are typically only required to prove the generation
of their transactions which can be done using the root hash of
the Merkle tree.
B. Direct Load Control (DLC)
In DLC, the DISCO manipulates the usage of devices on the
customer premise to manage the load, based on the received
DL transactions. DISCO and the customer would typically
sign a contract that allows DISCO to control energy usage
in the customer site. The DISCO then installs sensors at the
customer site to measure real-time data to prevent any service
inconvenience. This process is summarized in Figure 2 and is
illustrated in details below.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the transactions exchanged during the DLC process.
(1) Contract signing: During the bootstrapping the load
control contract is signed by the DISCO and the customer
which is used to manifest DLC. The contract contains the type
of devices in the consumer site to be controlled by the DISCO,
the type and number of sensors that DISCO can install, and the
duration when the DISCO can change the energy consumption
in the consumer site. DISCO initiates the contract signing
process by generating and signing a load control transaction
that is structured as below:
T ID||P T ID||PKGen||SignGen||PKRec||SignRec
||Ref.DISCO.ID||Metadata
Where T ID is the transaction ID which is essentially the
hash of the transaction content. DISCO initially generates gen-
esis transaction for each authorized customer. The customer
chains all its future transactions to the genesis transaction by
storing the ID of his previous transaction in P T ID field of
new transactions. The load control transaction is a multisign
transaction meaning that it requires signature of two entities
to be stored in the blockchain. The next four fields are the PK
and signature of the transaction generator and receiver. The
sensors installed in the customer site may generate transactions
in response to requests from DISCO, e.g., DISCO may request
temperature sensors in the consumer site to periodically send
site temperature to it. The verification of these transactions
involves verifying the corresponding request transaction gen-
erated by the DISCO. This ensures that the actions performed
by devices or sensors, e.g., turning off the cooling system,
is aligned with the DISCO request. Thus, the participating
nodes have to search the entire ledger of DISCO to find
the corresponding request transaction, which incurs significant
latency and processing overheads. To reduce this overhead,
the ID of the DISCO request transaction that has triggered
the generation of the current response transaction is stored
in Ref.DISCO.ID field. The latter applies for transactions
generated by the customer only. For DISCO transactions, this
field is set to NULL. Metadata field includes extra information
that the two communication entities may wish to exchange.
The contract between DISCO and the customer is encrypted
with the PK of the customer, to ensure confidentiality, and is
put in the metadata of the transaction. Next, the transaction is
broadcast (1.1 Fig 2). On receipt (1.2), the customer decrypts
the contract using its PK to verify the contract content. If the
customer agrees with the contract, he proceeds to sign the
received transaction by populating SignRec and broadcasts it
to the blockchain (1.3). The miners then store the transaction
in the blockchain as it contains both required signatures.
(2) Load data collection: Based on the contract, the DISCO
installs sensors in the customer site for monitoring purpose.
Initially, DISCO creates a genesis transaction for each sensor
which contains a virtual link to the transaction that contains the
contract (using Ref.DISCO.ID field) (2.1). The sensors collect
and share particular data from the consumer site depending on
sensor type, e.g., temperature. The genesis transaction needs
to be signed by both the DISCO and the customer to ensure
that installed sensors are as defined in the contract (2.2). Once
deployed, the sensors periodically send data to DISCO using
DL transactions (2.3).
(3) Action determination and execution: Based on the load
data collected from sensors, DISCO determines the load
control actions (3.1) using methods such as [10]. DISCO then
informs the devices in the consumer site of the identified
action using a load control transaction (3.2). On receiving the
latter, the devices first verify the transaction by validating the
signature with the PK of the transaction. Once verified, the
devices perform the indicated action in the transaction (3.3).
The outlined process enables the DISCO to mange load in
the grid in a secure and private manner.
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security and privacy of the
proposed method.
Security: In the proposed method, the transactions contain
the signed hash of the exchanged data which achieves integrity
of data and non-reputability. Recall that in DL, transactions
are generated without any asymmetric encryption and rely
on a hash value for authentication, data integrity, and non-
repudiation. Recall from Section III that the “secret” in the
DL transaction is the hash of a secret value along with data
and a nonce. The secret value can be utilized to authenticate
the consumer as the secret is only known by the consumer and
DISCO. The Data field ensures integrity of the data as if a
malicious node modifies data, the Secret generated by DISCO
will not match with the Secret in the received transaction.
Nonce protects against replay attack wherein a malicious node
repeats a communication by storing a transaction locally and
re-sending it to the network at any point of time. DISCO
discards transactions with duplicate nonces.
Privacy: The privacy of the proposed method is inherited
from the anonymity of the blockchain. Recall from Section
III that each participant uses a changeable PK as its identity
that introduces a level of anonymity among entities other than
DISCO. This protects against malicious nodes that may track
a costumer using its PK. Similar to other existing blockchain
instantiations, linking multiple PKs in the blockchain to
deanonymize a user, known as a linking attack in literature, is
possible in the proposed method.
The DL transaction contains the load and demand of the
consumer which constitutes privacy-critical information. The
proposed framework achieves a level of anonymity for DL
transactions as: i) the transactions are generated independently,
i.e., without relying on a previous transaction, and ii) only the
root hash of a Merkle tree of all DL transactions is stored in
the blockchain, thus there is less information for the attackers
to conduct linking attack.
The consumer can monitor the identity of the nodes that
have accessed its sensors, the frequency and duration of access,
and the shared information as all transactions are recorded in
the blockchain and can be monitored.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a blockchain-based direct load
control framework. We discussed disseminating the load data
from distribution nodes to the distribution company as well
as the direct load control process. To reduce the associated
processing overhead on participating nodes for frequently
sharing demand and load data, we proposed a hash-based
demand load transaction. Qualitative security and privacy anal-
ysis demonstrate the security and anonymity of the proposed
method.
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